9 This website set up by the United Nation Information Portal on Multilateral Environmental Agreements (InforMEA) gives a clear and synthetic overview of the general scope of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-20 (SPB) and Aichi Biodiversity Targets' diffusion: <http://ieg.informea.org/>. For instance, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has a wide array of activities that align with the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. The first UNCTAD BioTrade Congress, held in 2012, addressed ways in which it could contribute to meet the SPB and its Aichi Target and highlighted how its ongoing projects are already working towards sustainability and higher awareness of the values of biodiversity among stakeholder. In the health context, the World Health Organization, has published a report in 2012, underlining the place of health within the SPB and its targets and stressing the 'opportunities for better linkages of biodiversity and health goals.' Some institutions have integrated the Aichi targets within their own framework in a more formal way. The FAO's Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA), at its fifteenth regular session, highlighted the fact that the Aichi Biodiversity Targets are now being used as indicators in order to monitor the implementation of the voluntary guidelines to support the integration of genetic diversity into national climate change adaptation planning. The commission also requested its Secretariat to ensure that the upcoming global report on the State of the World's Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture contributes to the SPB and its target. This strong implication of the CGRFA is understandable as its mandate is closely in line with Aichi Target 13: minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding genetic diversity.
The Strategic Plan within the Biodiversity Cluster
This section describes how the MEAs incorporated the SPB into their own normative structure. In this article, 'normative structure,' or 'normative corpus,' is understood to be all of the decisions of the MEA bodies that can have a legal influence on the member states.
Following this rationale and in the context of our analysis, decisions 'taking note' of the SPB and its targets are not considered to be part of the normative corpus since their legal influence 10 Aichi Biodiversity Targets, <http://biodiversity.europa.eu/policy/target-1-and-related-aichi-targets>. 11 For example, UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies within the Cluster of Biodiversity-Related Multilateral Environmental Agreements (2012). It is important to note here that the term 'cluster' covers a wide array of situations reflecting various degrees of cooperation among multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). For instance, the 'biodiversity cluster' is far less integrated than the 'chemical cluster,' yet both share the same denomination. Clustering simply aims at increasing efficiency and effectiveness of MEAs with overlapping purposes. See S Oberthür, Clustering of Multilateral Agreements: Potentials and Limitations 2 International Environmental Agreements 317 at 318 (2002) . This objective is attained through different means depending on the specificities and history of the cooperating MEAs. 12 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially As Waterfowl Habitat, 996 UNTS 245 (1971) [Ramsar Convention]. 13 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1037 UNTS 151 (1972) . 14 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 993 UNTS 243 (1973) . 15 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1651 UNTS 333 (1979) [CMS] . 16 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79 (1992) . 17 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2400 UNTS 303 (2001) .
that its objectives are 'in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity' and will be attained by closely linking the treaty to the CBD. In addition, considering the fact that the ITPGRFA had been adopted within the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization and that this organization was taking steps to take the SPB into consideration (through its Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture), 22 it seems that, contrary to the Ramsar Convention, CITES, and the CMS, the incorporation of the SPB in a strategic plan, although not formal, could be considered to be 'automatic.' 22 Table 1 illustrates two main aspects of the diffusion of the SPB and its Aichi Biodiversity Targets. First, as requested by the CBD in its initial decision, the reaction of the other related MEAs of the biodiversity cluster was immediate. Each of them took into consideration the outcomes of the CBD's COP-10 at their first meetings following this event.
Report of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
This process is not new, and the MEAs usually take into consideration the outcomes of major meetings. It is part of the synergistic effort that has been apparent among the biodiversity regime complex 23 for several years. 24 However, such a broad and systematic reaction to a decision adopted within the CBD seems to be a first, as illustrated in the following discussion.
Second, for the three MEAs that incorporated the SPB in their normative corpus, the path that they followed was the same. Each of their COPs adopted amendments to their existing global strategies in order to contribute to the SPB. Clear linkages were established in order to confirm the role of the SPB as an overarching framework for biodiversity-related conventions.
As such, taking into account that several other partnerships and programs had been created for the implementation of the SPB, 25 it appears that one of the requirements of Decision X/2 of the CBD's COP-10 had been fulfilled: 'Cooperation will be enhanced with the programmes, funds and specialized agencies of the United Nations system as well as conventions and other multilateral and bilateral agencies, foundations and non-governmental organization.' 26 So, having described the 'space time' of this diffusion, this article will now compare it to previous cases of diffusion in the biodiversity cluster.
B. A Successful Diffusion
In order to distinguish between the SPB diffusion and previous cases of diffusion in the biodiversity cluster, the following two examples can be used as points of reference. First, the CBD's 2002 strategic plan for biodiversity illustrates the uneasy cooperation among biodiversity-related conventions due to the conflicting relations between the different Secretariats and, as such, emphasizes the achievement of the current SPB in terms of collaboration. Second, the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (AAPG) illustrate that, while the SPB's diffusion is not a 'first' in the literal sense, it may be the first time that we have witnessed such a widespread and systematic diffusion in the biodiversity cluster. This is not surprising considering that whereas the SPB insisted on the need for collaboration among the biodiversity-related conventions, the previous plan was completely silent on this matter. The lack of widespread diffusion can therefore be interpreted as a probable consequence of this silence.
The reports on the implementation of the 2002 strategic plans that were made by several permanent bodies of the CBD help us to understand the extent to which the plan had an impact on the global governance of biodiversity. interviews with the staff of the different Secretariats, thereby highlighting the problematic relationships existing within the cluster. 36 This lack of cooperation and trust was eventually addressed by the actors of the biodiversity cluster when they were considering the revision of the 2002 plan.
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All of these elements tend to support the idea that the elaboration and diffusion of the current strategic plan is mainly the result of a common understanding of what led to the failure of the 2002 plan in terms of cooperation. This aspect is fundamental since attaining the 2020 goals will not be possible without a common and coherent framework for all of the actors. Therefore, the conceptual pillars of the collaborative approach of the SPB were set by acknowledging, in consultation with others, what the previous plan had failed to initiate. 38 In conclusion, the case of the SPB is completely opposite to the previous plan in terms of collaboration. However, this comparison only emphasizes the particularities of the SPB in the context of the former plan's isolation. In order to truly bring out its distinctive features as a diffusion case, parallels must be drawn with the other cases in the biodiversity cluster.
(ii) AAPG
The biodiversity cluster is characterized by several institutional linkages between MEAs.
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These linkages have been understood as being a method for managing fragmentation in global environmental governance. 40 This relational structure is therefore highly favourable for the diffusion of concepts and/or norms among the different MEAs. This section of the article will analyse an example of a diffusion based on its first appearance in the CBD fora and its later incorporation in the normative corpus of other biodiversity-related conventions: the AAPG. depicts accurately the achievements and remaining gaps in this field.
The AAPG were adopted at COP-7 to the CBD in 2004. 42 Their aim was to provide a framework to ensure the sustainability of biodiversity uses. They were designed to be taken into account by 'governments, resource managers, indigenous and local communities, the private sector and other stakeholders' in order to 'ensure that their use of the components of biodiversity will not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity.' 43 This framework was subsequently endorsed by other conventions and most notably by CITES.
A few months after the CBD's COP-7, the CITES' COP adopted a resolution on the sustainable use of biodiversity. 44 Members made clear references to the CBD's decision on the matter and called for the implementation of the guidelines and further work on these guidelines by the relevant bodies. The working documents made available during COP-13 to CITES also emphasize the fact that the AAPG represent more of a cross-fertilization process, rather than a case of diffusion. Indeed, the principles were conceptualized by taking into account the 'non-detriment findings standards' of CITES. 45 Moreover, this adoption of the AAPG was made in clear reference to the memorandum of understanding existing between CITES and the CBD (thus illustrating the fact that CITES had incorporated at least once in its resolutions a decision taken in another forum).
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Among the biodiversity cluster, CITES has been the only MEA to achieve this level of integration. The AAPG were discussed within the CMS but never expressly incorporated into a decision, and, as for the Ramsar Convention, the members had already relied on the concept of 'wise use' that was initially present in Articles 2 and 6 of the treaty. 47 Finally, based on a review of the official documents available from the conventions, it appears that neither the the SPB. However, this less broad diffusion did not mean that there was an absence of cooperation on the subject. For instance, the Secretariats of the biodiversity cluster, through the work undertaken within the BLG, worked on making the AAPG as accessible as possible for the diverse practitioners in charge of the implementation of the different MEAs.
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Although the principles did not undergo the same fate in terms of diffusion, they still were the subject of substantial cooperation between the conventions.
In conclusion, the diffusion of the SPB within the biodiversity cluster appears to be new in the sense that it can be noticed in all of the related MEAs and has led to substantive changes in the strategic plans of CITES, the CMS, and the Ramsar Convention. biodiversity regime complex-namely the members of the different MEAs, the respective bodies established by them, and the relevant non-state actors (NSA).
Relying on the official documents and archives that are available from the Earth Negotiation Bulletin, 51 this article identifies the respective roles of these actors in the diffusion of the SPB and its Aichi Biodiversity Targets. By doing so, it aims to illustrate the miscellaneous types of influences that can be witnessed at an international level. In order to identify accurately the impact of the different actors, this section will take into account the negotiations that shaped the current SPB in its collaborative aspect and the subsequent discussions that promoted its diffusion.
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This analysis leads to one substantial finding: that the Secretariats of the MEAs have had a strong influence on the collaborative aspect of the SPB. However, before discussing this topic, it is important to stress here that the states and the NSA were not completely absent in the diffusion of the SPB. Indeed, the Secretariats have a necessarily restricted impact on the governance of their respective fields. Even if they have a high degree of influence and have been described as autonomous actors, 53 the shaping and adoption of regulations is a process in which other actors intervene. Yet the input from these other actors has been mainly influential in shaping the new strategic plan rather than in promoting its diffusion within other MEAs.
For example, in regard to this specific issue, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature produced a document providing a useful analysis of the possible synergies between the other strategic plans and the SPB. 54 In addition, during the different MEAs' COPs, states were mainly in favour of the incorporation of the SPB and its Aichi Biodiversity Targets in other strategic plans. The only exception to this tendency was during the CITES' COP-16 when the United States opposed the incorporation of the SPB. The United States is still not a party to the CBD, and its opposition can thus be understood to be a rejection of the CBD's influence over the biodiversity cluster. 55 These important caveats aside, the Secretariats remain the key actors in this case of diffusion. 51 The Earth Negotiation Bulletin is frequently used as an official report for multilateral negotiations in global environmental governance. 52 The documents accessed for this research only reflect a fraction of the realities that shape the relation between actors. Further research on this subject can and should be undertaken through interviews with the relevant participants of biodiversity-related conventions. 53 its overall influence, it had definitely had a significant impact on the diffusion of the SPB among the biodiversity cluster.
The BLG is a venue where the Secretariats have been able to express concerns about the previous plan. As described earlier, the former secretary-general of CITES emphasized his illustrate the paradigm shift in their conceptualization. 2002 was the year of the strategic plan for the CBD, whereas 2010 was the year of the strategic plan for biodiversity.
In September 2010, a month before the CBD's COP-10, a 'High Level retreat among Secretariats of Biodiversity-related conventions' was convened by the CBD's Secretariat. The members of the BLG and the members of the Joint Liaison Group (which is composed of members of the permanent bodies of the Rio conventions) discussed several important issues concerning the upcoming events among which the future SPB was to be addressed. 63 The
Secretariats recognized the relevance of the SPB as a framework for all biodiversity-related conventions, but it also stressed the fact that ultimately the choice of using the SPB was 'a matter for the governing bodies of those conventions to decide.' 64 This meeting further developed the discussion that occurred during the third meeting of the Working Group on the Review and Implementation of the CBD, in which the integration of the SPB among the biodiversity-related conventions was mentioned.
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These different meetings and the attention given to the Secretariats' inputs on the subject set the groundwork that was necessary to establish a feeling of ownership over the SPB within the different biodiversity-related conventions-the same feeling of ownership that was lacking in the previous plans. In the case of the BLG, the CBD's Secretariat has found a venue where it is able to use its normative influence in an effective manner within the biodiversity cluster. 71 As such, the collaborative approach set up within the BLG may be seen to be a success for the CBD's Secretariat, which has already been described as an overall 'well-functioning environmentalist international bureaucracy that has developed significant influence on international negotiations and cooperation as well as … on scientific discourses.' 72 By promoting a framework based on common interests, rather than on a self-centred strategic plan, the CBD's Secretariat has managed to obtain the support of the biodiversity-related conventions (even if other important elements might have had an important influence on the behaviour of the other convention's bodies). 
A. The Adoption of Strategic Plans
Two main aspects must be highlighted concerning the adoption of the strategic plans within the Ramsar Convention, CITES, and the CMS. First, the current strategic plans are the result of similar developments for these three MEAs. During the 1990s, each of these conventions initiated review processes in order to assess their effectiveness after decades of existence.
This process led to the adoption of strategic plans as means of properly orientating the subsequent actions of their members. These plans were then amended on a regular basis in order to reflect the new priorities of each of these conventions and were eventually harmonized through the incorporation of the SPB. The following table offers a short summary of this process. As such, we can identify three distinct periods of governance in the biodiversity cluster. The first one took place when the three biodiversity-related conventions were implemented with no overarching framework in order to better channel the actions of the states. The second, which took place from the 1990s until the beginning of the 2000s, 75 Most of the COP meetings led to discussions on the strategic plans, the years listed in this graph are those during which the COP added notable modifications to the strategic plans (eg, new time frame, new goals, or objectives Therefore, as a final step in the study of the strategic plans, one must analyse their implementation.
C. The Subsequent Implementation
The recent adjustments to the strategic plans make it hard to assess with certainty the influence the incorporation of the SPB had on their implementation. However, by taking a closer look at the actions the previous strategic plans triggered in the context of the conventions' application, it is possible to measure the legal effects of these plans. The different strategic plans have had several different legal effects, although they were not significant. For instance, the CITES' plan may have had an effect on the reporting obligations of the members states. 89 Even though the strategic vision does not specifically call for modifications of the reporting obligations of the state, the work of the CITES' Standing Committee, following the decisions taken by the COP, led to a modification of this procedural obligation.
The same influence on the reporting obligations can be perceived within the Ramsar Convention's framework, where the strategic plan calls for modification in the reporting obligation in order for the subsequent reports to present the activities undertaken for the realization of the different goals. These reporting obligations can be witnessed in the available reports submitted to the subsequent COP. For instance, the report of the Netherlands has a section detailing the decisions and actions taken in order to implement the strategic plan.
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All of these elements tend to support the hypothesis that, as such, the incorporation of a reference to the SPB in the strategic plans will have, at most, a limited legal effect on the different MEAs' regimes. However, the biodiversity cluster is now characterized by a growing cross-influence of its different elements. Weak isolated effects do not necessarily mean weak global effects. This disconnection between the sum and its parts is one of the 
Cumulative Effects: An Example of Dynamics and Interrelations within the Biodiversity Cluster
As a whole, the diffusion of the SPB among the biodiversity cluster can be considered to be a supplementary means of management for the fragmentation of the biodiversity regime.
However, beyond these theoretical discussions on fragmentation, the diffusion of the SPB may very well have concrete practical repercussions, most notably concerning the access for conventions other than the CBD to GEF funding.
A. A Significant Step towards Harmonization in the Biodiversity Cluster
Interplay management has been referred to as 'conscious efforts by any relevant actor or groups of actors, in whatever form of forum, to address and improve institutional interaction and its effect.' 91 The diffusion of the SPB adds to several different interplay management tools used within the biodiversity cluster in order to cope with fragmentation that is understood as 'the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rulecomplexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice.' 92 Yet, the SPB differs from the previous initiatives not only because of its holistic nature but also because of its potential impact on the interpretation of the biodiversity-related conventions. . 94 The legal nature of these agreements has yet to be formally determined, 95 and, whatever it might be, the memorandums typically only concern the relationship between institutions and do not concern directly the obligations of the MEA parties. Nevertheless, their use is widespread within the biodiversity cluster, and practically all of the conventions are institutionally linked to one another via these instruments.
Alternatively, joint work programs are focused on very specific actions. Moreover, even though they are set within the framework of the memorandums established between the Secretariats, they can also call for actions from the member states. The joint work program established between the CMS and the CBD for the 2002-05 period 96 has a very detailed set of actions to be undertaken by the different actors of both regimes, be they institutions or parties.
Conversely, the joint work program between the CMS and the Ramsar Convention only concerns the MEAs' Secretariats. 97 It seems that there is no general architecture for joint work programs, but they tend to focus on specific themes, contrasting with the broader, but strictly institutional, cooperation established by the memorandums. Memorandums and joint programs appear as supplementary elements that stress the role played by the Secretariat in the global governance of biodiversity and ecosystems.
In addition, MEAs have unilateral approaches to cooperation. The COPs have adopted several decisions establishing the framework for collaboration. These decisions can concern specific MEAs or the whole set of relevant treaties. impact on collaboration in the biodiversity cluster? As a general framework, for actions to be undertaken by all relevant actors the SPB must appear to be a holistic and indirect approach for collaboration. By mainstreaming all activities in order for them to meet a clear and preestablished set of goals, the diffusion of the SPB prevents conflicting actions. As such, this diffusion is complementary to the other means of synergies that aim to prevent the duplication of actions. The accumulation of these management means is a significant step towards optimum synergy within the cluster. As stated earlier in this article, each cluster is unique, and at this point comparing the 'biodiversity cluster' to the 'chemical cluster'-which is admittedly a remarkable example of integration among different MEAs-is not necessarily relevant. Indeed, the Secretariats of the biodiversity cluster-which appear to be the most influential architects for synergy-have underlined the fact that, considering the history of the different MEAs, this example could not be reiterated with the biodiversity-related conventions.
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(ii) The SPB as a common standard for interpretation
While the SPB appears to be a useful complementary and overarching tool for synergies between conventions, it may also have an influence on the interpretation of the MEAs that have incorporated it in their strategic plans. The widespread diffusion of the SPB and its targets, either in other strategic plans or in decisions taking note of its existence, can be an important element in the interpretation of the biodiversity-related conventions. The different methods for treaty interpretation are described in Articles 31-33 of the VCLT 103 and have been recognized as reflecting international custom on this issue. 104 In the present case, Article 31 is the most relevant to understanding the potential effect of the SPB diffusion.
On the question of interpretation, the existing literature in legal research is abundant.
Several conceptual approaches exist and, depending on which one is followed, the diffusion of the SPB and its targets may have an influence on the general interpretation of treaties in the biodiversity cluster. First, with respect to the object and purpose of the biodiversity-related conventions, the fact that the SPB is now a generally accepted framework for all of the studied treaties indicates that they now share a common purpose. However, this general particular context, effectiveness is whether or not the object of the treaty-its obligations-is implemented. Efficacy is achieved if the obligations tend to the fulfilment of the purpose.
Therefore, using the distinction between object and purpose-effectiveness and efficacyallows us to realize a legal assessment of a treaty through interpretation. By identifying the object and the purpose, one can then assess if the obligations are really implemented and, second, if they really tend to fulfil the purpose of the conventions. With the SPB as a common framework for the biodiversity-related conventions, the reviewing of these instruments is now far more coherent.
In addition, recognizing the SPB and its targets as major elements of the purpose of the biodiversity-related conventions would have broad legal consequences for states wishing to join these conventions. It would limit the possible scope of any reservation they would seek to hold against these treaties, as Article 19(c) of the VCLT prohibits reservations that are incompatible with the object or purpose of the treaty. Another obligation that would be potentially influenced by the SPB as a shared purpose would be the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry in force (Article 18 of the VCLT). This obligation would also influence any bilateral agreement between parties of the biodiversityrelated conventions in order to modify them (Article 41 of the VCLT). Finally, actions clearly going against the SPB could be considered to be material breach of the conventions and thus result in the termination of the treaty (Article 60 of the VCLT). Thus, in theory, seeing the SPB as a common purpose has substantial legal impacts on the biodiversity regime. However, as often happens in the field of international environmental law, legal theory is dwarfed by political realities.
As useful as this distinction between object and purpose might be in this context, doctrine and practice on this issue tend to move in a different way. Authors often criticize this distinction because of its origin. They argue that, although this distinction might be relevant at a national level, it has no legitimate justification at the international level. considered, de facto, as relevant. Therefore, the SPB, as a whole and through its incorporation within other strategic plans, is an essential part of the context for the interpretation of the biodiversity-related conventions.
However, who is the interpreter? Most of the literature focuses on the role of the judge in the context of conflictual interpretation. Yet this focus has little significance in the context of the biodiversity cluster since the intervention of a judge as a means of resolving disputes is highly unlikely. These MEAs usually establish their own mechanisms in order to monitor the implementation of their obligations, and these mechanisms differ from the judicial process through which a judge or an arbitrator will interpret a treaty. As such, the previous analyses will surely remain theoretical in view of the fact that none of them is likely to be validated or 'The international law of treaty interpretation is based on the perspective of an objective third party, such as a court, seeking to interpret an agreement after it has been negotiated.' 118 Therefore, even though the theoretical impact of the SPB can be significant, without the intervention of a third party there can only be speculation. Nevertheless, through the accumulation of decisions concerning the SPB within the biodiversity cluster, the practical impact of the SPB's diffusion can be witnessed in some circumstances-for example, in relation to Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funding, which is described in the following section. Mercury. Each of these convention texts comprises an article concerning the GEF and its role.
In 2014, 183 states were members of the GEF (including the United States).
The GEF trust fund is replenished every four years. Recently, the GEF underwent its sixth replenishment set over the 2014-18 period. The discussions leading to the replenishment process are crucial as they shape the financing priorities of the future fund. These discussions involve the contributing states and frame the development of different strategies that are 'guidance from the relevant conventions for which the GEF serves as an interim financial mechanism.' 123 As such, the GEF has established approximately a dozen strategies reflecting the objectives and purposes of the conventions for which it plays the role of financial mechanism.
In this context, the diffusion of the SPB-most notably the incorporation of its targets into other strategic plans-is a key element for access to GEF funding. Indeed, in September 'investigate possible ways to establish the means to secure funding to support the provision of technical assistance to CITES Parties in relation to regulating wildlife trade.' 128 The GEF was then presented as a potential financial mechanism for CITES. The Secretariat continued its work on this matter and presented a document at COP-16 inviting the member states to accept the GEF as a financial mechanism for CITES. 129 States were mainly in favour of this proposition 130 but postponed its adoption until the next COP in order for the Secretariat to further elaborate on this topic.
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Between the sixty-first meeting to the Standing Committee and COP-16, several conferences gave momentum to the CITES' Secretariat's objective of finding a means to access GEF funding. In 2012, the CBD held its COP-11 in Hyderabad where the GEF was instructed to include the SPB and its targets in the strategy concerning biodiversity. 132 This diffusion of the SPB in the GEF framework was a seminal step towards a broader financing for conventions having adopted the SPB within their own strategic plan. Even though the GEF was not adopted as a financial mechanism for CITES during its last COP, all of the elements However, the outcome of these discussions is still uncertain. It was noted during that meeting that the process for the GEF to formally become a financial mechanism for CITES
had not yet started. 133 How can the GEF become a formal financial mechanism considering the fact that, for the conventions relying on the GEF, its status is inscribed within the text of the conventions? Two hypotheses are possible. The first one would be to 'simply' amend the text of CITES by adding dispositions related to the GEF. However, the amendment procedure is subject to the very strict conditions of Article XVII of CITES, and CITES has only been amended twice and the procedure leading to the entry into force of the amendments is extremely lengthy (thirty years for the Gaborone Amendment). In addition to being slow, the outcome of the procedure is also unpredictable since the two-thirds requirement can lock the process into a stalemate for several years.
The second hypothesis would be to construct a 'legal scheme' based on institutional partnerships and the diffusion of the SPB. This method could bypass the obstacles inherent in the amendment procedure. For instance, a memorandum of understanding could be concluded between the GEF and CITES. The financing of activities implementing CITES could then be possible, on the condition that those activities contribute to the achievement of the SPB and its Aichi Biodiversity Targets. In a way, on a practical level, the results would be the same as if the treaty was amended. The only difference would be a formal dependence on the SPB and its targets as an imperative condition that would need to be fulfilled in order to access GEF funding. If this hypothesis were to be applied, it would then be a situation where the accumulation and interplay of 'soft' measures such as memorandums and the diffusion of strategic plans within a broader context would lead to practical effects equivalent to an amendment.
This puts into perspective the usual distinction in international law between soft law and hard law and may also contradict Prosper Weil's assertion that 'the proliferation of soft norms … does not help strengthen the international normative system.' 134 Currently, this proliferation of soft norms appears to be a mean of reinforcing the existing 'hard law.' This highlights the relevance of the distinction between object and purpose, effectiveness and efficacy. By accessing GEF funding, the members of CITES would have the means to insure that the implementation of CITES is coherent with its purpose. Consequently, this would increase the efficacy of the convention.
This distinction between effectiveness and efficacy is of great importance when considering international environmental law (or any laws regarding the environment). If a convention is implemented but does not succeed in attaining its purpose, can it be considered to be a success? Must a norm only be evaluated on its strict implementation rather than on its and other institutions 139 that only briefly evoked the GEF. 140 As for CITES and the CMS, the Secretariat was also requested to develop further relationships with funding organizations.
However, it does not seem that this topic was thoroughly discussed during the last meeting of the Ramsar Convention's Standing Committee in October 2014.
Should the CITES experience with the GEF prove successful, it may be a strong incentive for reiterating the process in other fora. There seems to be no major obstacle for this link to be formally made since, as the GEF secretary recalled during the BLG meeting, the GEF already has supported indirectly numerous activities from other conventions. Moreover, since the BLG has proven to be an efficient catalyst for cooperation, it could prove itself useful once more by serving as an exchange platform for Secretariats. CITES' next COP will be decisive on this issue, and, should the GEF become a financial mechanism for the convention through the means of 'unconventional' measures, it would provide definitive proof that international environmental law has overthrown the classic conceptions of international law. This would also be a first step towards a broader recognition of the GEF in the biodiversity cluster as this institution has been described as lacking visibility among the actors of global governance.
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Figure 2 illustrates how access to GEF funding is the result of an elaborate interplay of 'soft' norms leading to a very practical and measurable outcome, thereby highlighting the difference between the binding aspect of a norm and its legal effect. To conclude, this article highlights the fact that biodiversity-related conventions now share a common framework for their actions and that this framework is not only symbolic but can also have concrete effect on the governance of biodiversity. It also illustrates that this common framework was strongly supported by the Secretariats, which are influential autonomous actors in global environmental governance. Finally, it stresses that while the CBD does not have a higher legal value (as provided for in Article 22 of the convention), its political influence in the biodiversity cluster now seems to be at its peak.
However, even though this situation appears to be a success in the synergistic effort of the biodiversity cluster, one can only remain cautious when considering its outcome on the state of global biodiversity and ecosystems. In October 2014 in Pyeong-Chang, it was clear that the 2020 objectives were far from being attained. 142 Only a few NBSAPs had been revised in order to integrate the SPB and its targets, and the discussions were mainly focused on financial issues. 143 How useful can this common framework be if the current state of biodiversity and ecosystems continues to worsen? As emphasized by the UNEP-WCMC in its report on synergies in the biodiversity cluster, the synergetic process must be led by states in order to be truly efficient as a tool for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems. 144 Considering the results of the Pyeong-Chang COP, states are not sufficiently involved in this effort. For instance, this is particularly true concerning Latin American states that have a very low degree of policy coherence in the implementation of the biodiversityrelated conventions. 145 When studying international environmental law and the existing governance systems, it is all too easy to succumb to pessimism. Focusing on the flaws of such a complex and fragmented system is relatively effortless compared to finding workable solutions to its By comparing the behaviour of the different actors of the systems, it seems that there is a disconnection between the perceived goals. While institutions are trying to establish a comprehensive and efficient set of goals, states act in order to maximize their interests and reduce their costs. This situation is symptomatic of global environmental instruments where negotiations tend to water down obligations. For instance, the CBD does not have the legal tools to match its ambitions. Still, while the legal obligations it entailed have grown weaker, its political influence has strengthened. As a result, the SPB has spread to other instruments that have clearer legal obligations, such as CITES. In this situation, there is a hope that MEAs having a greater effectiveness may help in achieving some of the targets set in the SPB.
Moreover, states are now under both a top-down and bottom-up influence. This article has focused on the SPB within the biodiversity cluster, but with its incorporation in the Rio+20, the strategic plan and its targets have gained momentum and are now omnipresent on the international agenda for the global environment. The current discussions within the CBD are focusing on how to link the post-2015 sustainable development goals with the strategic plan. 147 The work program of the newly established IPBES was also specifically designed in order to contribute to the SPB. The international push towards the achievement of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets is clear. It appears that all of the relevant actors at the international level now share the same reference point. 148 In addition, the growing involvement of civil society adds a bottom-up influence to this top-down push towards the achievement of the SPB. Nongovernmental organizations are influential actors within the different regime complexes for environmental governance, and they have also adopted the SPB as a framework for actions.
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This set of influences may provide incentives that are sufficient enough to induce positive reactions from the states. The more incentives the states will have for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems, the more likely it is that the SPB will be a success. The diffusion of the SPB has helped to strengthen and align those incentives; the hope is that this will lead to better biodiversity conservation results in the future. 147 For more details, see CBD, <https://www.cbd.int/idb/2015/goals/>. 148 P. Muller, Les Politiques Publiques (2013) at 55. The referential is understood as the representation of the reality on which one wishes to intervene. In the case of the global governance of biodiversity and ecosystems, it can be said that all relevant actors now share the SPB as a referential. They share the same perception of the threats on biodiversity and ecosystems and of the necessary actions needed to reduce those threats. 149 For instance, see the declaration of the World Wildlife Fund, <http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/policy/conventions/cbd/cop12/>.
